The advent of personal genom ics com panies o ffering direct transla tion of scientif ic data into personal health information, calls into question traditional policies to ref use disclosure of such scientif ic data to resea rch participants. This seems especially true for population biobanks, as they collect not only genotype in formation but also associated phenotype infor mation, and thus may be in a unique position to translate their scien tific f indings into perso nal h ealth inf ormation f or their participan ts. Disclosure of such inform ation seem s mandated by the expectations raised by biobanks ('to help bring about the era of personalized m edicine') and their participants' rights to know health inform ation, to know c linical research results, to life and health and particular ly th eir right to benef it. R efusals to disclos e suc h information can be grounded in the lack of analytical validity and/or clinical utility of most findings, the need to avoid the ther apeutic m isconception, the complexity and costs involved in translation and disclosure and the disproportio nate burden resulting from the obliga tion to r espect p articipants' right not to know before any disclosure can be m ade. Currently, any dem ands by part icipants in population biobanks for full disclosure o f all pertine nt personal health inf ormation potentia lly resu lting f rom the biobank's scientific findings are unlikely to be granted by a Dutch court under Dutch and international law. As the law stands now, a population biobank is neither a doctor nor a personal genom ics company. However, in view of the rapid scientific, m edical, technological, comm ercial and social developments, population biobanks m ust prepare to take more care of their participants' legitimate interest in receiving as much validated personal health inform ation as re asonably possible, in a tim ely fashion, by developing appropriate transl ation and disclosure m echanisms. This paper exam ines whether population biobank participants ha ve the right, under Dutch civil law and international law, to f ull disclosu re, i.e. to all in formation genera ted by the biobank that is per tinent to their presen t a nd f uture health. It pioneers the for mat of a hypothetical court case to elucidate the lega l and policy argum ents" for and against full disclosure.
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Introduction
If you provide your DNA to deCodeme, you will be provided, within 2-4 weeks, with information on your genetic risk for a series of diseases, based on the relation of your genetic scan measurements to relevant scientific literature regarding genetic risks. If you provide your DNA to a population biobank, you will not be provided with any information, genetic or otherwise. True, a population biobank is not a commercial personal genomics company and the utility of "direct-to-consumer" susceptibility testing has been questioned. Nevertheless, the ability of companies like deCodeme to translate scientific findings into personal health information for their customers, in a matter of weeks, does raise the question why population biobanks decline any translation of their findings into personal health information for their participants. The question is even more pertinent given that a population biobank has all the data necessary for a proper translation that commercial providers have not: the phenotype measurements, the medical record, the family history and the life-style data of the individual participant, all regularly updated and accessible in standardized format.
The rationale for non-disclosure is that most research findings are aggregate findings of an exploratory nature, lacking analytical validity or clinical utility for the individual concerned. However, both the nature of population biobank studies and recent developments in technology, medicine and ethics seem to provide support for calls for more or even full disclosure to individual participants. In addition, international legal instruments increasingly recognize a right to feedback of research results in general. It has been argued, convincingly, that under common law a biobank might owe its participants a legal duty to feed back in the, admittedly rare, situation where biobank research reveals that an individual is at imminent risk of a serious yet treatable condition.
2 That argument, however, begs some questions. What, exactly, is a 'serious condition'? What, exactly, is 'treatable'? And, more fundamentally, why should such a duty be limited to imminent risks, to serious conditions and conditions that are treatable? This paper examines whether population biobank participants have the right, under Dutch civil law and international law, to full disclosure, i.e. to all information generated by the biobank that is pertinent to their present and future health. It pioneers the format of a hypothetical court case to elucidate the legal and policy arguments pro and con full disclosure and to illustrate how a Dutch civil law court might arrive at its verdict. While fictitious, the case draws on a number of existing population biobank studies. The presentation of the facts of the case will be followed by the briefs of both parties, the considerations of the hypothetical court and the verdict.
Case study
The invitation. A healthy 45-year-old woman (X) receives an invitation letter from her family doctor (GP) to participate in a major study called the "Biobank". Her GP explains to X that the study aims 'to track to their sources the causes' of common complex disorders, such as diabetes, cancer and Alzheimer's. These disorders are Joining the biobank. X decides to join the study. At an appointment at the assessment centre, a nurse practitioner measures her height, weight, BMI, pulmonary function, bone density and blood pressure. A specially trained staff member collects three tablespoons of her blood for future DNA-analysis and she provides a urine sample. She fills in a questionnaire, answering detailed questions about her education, employment, physical activity, nutrition habits, general health condition, smoking and alcohol consumption, hospitalisations, diseases suffered, medicaments used, hormonal contraceptive preparations and menopause medicaments, and pregnancies. There are also questions about her nationality and native language, as well as detailed questions relating to her parents, grandparents and great-grandparents. X signs a consent form allowing the Biobank to re-contact her and to follow her health for the term of her participation, directly through her medical record and through other records that may be related to her health (e.g. occupational or residential information). She goes home with a print-out of her measurements. Every other year, she shows up at the appointment centre to provide fresh samples and updates to the questionnaires.
Demanding disclosure. Halfway into the study, X develops diabetes and suffers a heart attack. As cardiovascular diseases run in the family she is fearful of an imminent stroke. Her daughter has just been recruited into the study and was informed that both her cholesterol level and her blood pressure were abnormally high. Fearing that this may all be related and 'genetic', X contacts the Biobank. For some years now, the Biobank's newsletters have alerted her to a series of scientific publications pertaining to these disorders, all based on research on the Biobank. She reminds the Biobank of its stated ambition that research findings should be 'quickly available for the prevention and cure of disease'. Arguing that the Biobank is in a perfect position to translate its findings to her individual situation, she demands disclosure of all genetic and non-genetic risk information pertaining to her present and future health, regardless of whether the risks indicated by the findings are imminently lifethreatening, high, moderate or low risk, regardless of whether the findings concern a condition that is treatable, actionable, have reproductive importance or are merely recreational, and regardless of whether the findings relate to conditions that are late or early onset.
Participants will NOT be provided with information (genetic or otherwise) about their own individual results or incidental findings derived from or made in the course of examination of the database or samples by research undertaken after enrolment.
X initiates legal proceedings, challenging the Biobank's non-disclosure policy. She posts her complaint on the Biobank webforum, which in no time is filled with expressions of support from thousands of other participants, who are willing to join the lawsuit.
The Tuskegee Experiment. In 1932 the US Public Health Service (PHS), with the approval of Tuskegee Institute and the local health department, initiated in Macon County, Alabama, an observational study to determine the natural course of untreated, latent syphilis in black males. 7 The study comprised 410 Negro men with untreated syphilis and a comparable group of 201 uninfected Negro men. 8 The syphilites were recruited under the impression that they were being treated for their 'bad blood', a local idiom that encompassed syphilis as well as some anemias. 9 They were enticed with offers of free medical examinations and special free treatments. 10 Although data from the Study were reported in medical journals, neither the general public nor, with the exception of a few local doctors and administrators and officials of the Tuskegee Institute, the public in Macon County had any knowledge of the study until it was exposed by the Associated Press in 1972. 11 , 12 After a 1973 government report concluded that the study, in retrospect, was ethically unjustified and that penicillin should have been made available to the participants in the study not later than 1953, the study was halted. 13 The lawsuit. Surviving participants filed a lawsuit against the US federal government, Casper Weinberger as Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Public Health Service, the State of Alabama, the Milbank Fund and a number of individuals connected with the study, seeking $1.8 billion in damages for the surviving participants and the heirs of those who had died (Pollard v. United States of America).
14 Alleging that the Public Health officials purposely did not inform the participants when they were found to have syphilis, that they intentionally withheld this information from participants, that the participants were never advised that any of them had syphilis, and were never treated for syphilis, the participants' attorney claimed that the government had violated their civil rights guaranteed under the Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, section VI of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. 15 
X's Brief
Theory of X's case Legal arguments. To support her claims, X advances a variety of legal arguments under Dutch civil law and international law. First, she invokes the terms of her participation in the Biobank which are set forth in the consent form (A. Contract). Second, she maintains that the Biobank's non-disclosure policy has become obsolete, in view of scientific, technological and societal developments (B. Invalidity of NonDisclosure). Third, she invokes a number of statutory, constitutional and international human rights and professional norms to support her action for negligence (C. Negligence).
A. Contract A. 1 Consent and Patient Information Brochure. X's relationship with the Biobank is, primarily, governed by contract. She participates in the Biobank on the basis of her informed consent. Her consent is based upon the information she has received from the Biobank: the Participant Information Brochure (PIB). Collectively, the consent document signed by X and the PIB set forth the contractual terms and conditions of her participation. A core provision of the contract is X's right to discontinue her participation and to withdraw her consent. X admits that she has the right to withdraw at any time. But her point is that her right to withdraw entails the right to be informed on any relevant personal findings so she can make an informed decision whether she has reason to withdraw. Her willingness to continue to participate might be affected by significant new findings developed during the course of the research. The implications of these findings for an individual, no matter how qualified and limited in terms of analytical validity and clinical utility, may lead her to reconsider her initial consent and to withdraw from the study. 16 , 17 She can only effectively use her right to withdraw if she receives disclosure of the Biobank's findings.
A.2 Raised expectations. X also claims that the Biobank raised her expectation that she would receive information pertaining to her personal health. According to the PIB, the study aims to link abstract genomic data with concrete patient medical records, to generate large amounts of data to accurately describe patients and to bring about the era of personalised medicine. These objectives were a major incentive for X to participate in the study and part of the contract. As the Biobank could have known that a primary reason for participants to participate in genetic studies is their wish to find out about their own health, not disclosing pertinent health information amounts to a breach of contract.
B. Invalidity of Non-Disclosure policy B.1 Non-disclosure policy obsolete. The traditional policy of non-disclosure rests on a number of considerations, which include, but are not limited to, (i) the fact that most research findings in epidemiology or cohort studies are aggregate findings of an exploratory nature, with little or no analytical validity or clinical utility for the individual concerned, (ii) the costs, competence and complexity involved in proper reporting to individuals and (iii) the fact that these findings ordinarily cannot be linked to identifiable participants. 18 Also, the policy is based on the traditional concept of hypothesis-driven research. For this type of research, the chances of making incidental findings, i.e. findings discovered in the course of conducting the research but beyond the aims of the study, were considered to be minimal. Traditional disclosure policies are based on the recommendation that the research must be designed so as to minimize the chances of an incidental finding. 19 X argues that the above rationale has become obsolete, in view of the nature of Biobank research developments in technology, medicine and society.
B.1.1 Nature of Biobank research. Unlike most traditional studies, the Biobank is designed to form a resource that will enable the conduct of not just one, but hundreds of different research projects into all kinds of diseases, some of which have yet to be formulated, by a host of multidisciplinary research teams, rather than focusing on a specific disease. 20 It is expected to identify risk factors related to more than one disease and the occurrence of various diseases within one individual. 21 The Biobank is set up to facilitate large-scale genomic epidemiology pursued as "discovery research". In such research any genomic pattern correlating with pathology may be captured and studied. 22 Finally, the Biobank researchers have the ability to link research findings to individual research participants and, in many cases, to 23 participants' blood relatives. work has eing studied, but also for other data that have been identified with ther disorders. 
B.1.2 Technological and scientific developments.
X further points to a number of new high-throughput technologies used by the Biobank which are capable of generating large amounts of information at low cost and high speed. 24 In addition, Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS) 25 permit interrogation of the entire human genome at levels of resolution previously unattainable, in thousands of unrelated individuals, unconstrained by prior hypotheses regarding genetic associations with disease. 26 ,
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Even if their purpose is not to provide results about individual participants, the may generate such results, ranging on a continuum from clinically significant information to information relevant to ancestry and genealogy, to information that is merely of recreational interest. 28 Every time a GWAS is conducted, the researcher the opportunity to look in each individual's DNA, not only for data that correlates with the disorder b o
B.1.3 'Translational' developments.
One of the rationales of traditional non-disclos policies is that the interpretation and application of scientific findings in the clinic requires a chain of evidence, the goal being to translate findings from "PubMed to patient". It involves replication, randomized clinical trials, professional consensus building, the adoption of protocols, and the establishment of analytical validity an clinical utility. The ultimate use of the information in the clinic is controlled and limited by the physician as the traditional gatekeeper of the healthcare infrastructure. This traditional chain of translation has been challenged by the emergence of person genomics services. Personal genomics companies 30 , 31 , 32 claim to be able to bri the gap between peer-reviewed and published findings on the one hand and the individual, or at least, his genotype, on the other. 33 , 34 Using scientific, publi knowledge, they analyze samples collected at home, to discover individual predispositions for a variety of common conditions. 35 , 36 , 37 X argues that if these companies can translate the scientific literature into personal health information in a matter of weeks, then the Biobank could do the same for her, and more. After all, it is the Biobank that is the primary producer of such findings. On top of that, the Biobank has superior, long-term access to all relevant phenotype data, stored in a standardized way, to help trans
C. Negligence
The third argument advanced by X is an action for negligence. For a negligence lawsuit to succeed under Dutch civil law, X must establish that the refusal by the Biobank to feed back findings, intended or incidental, to X either infringes upon her personal rights (C.1 Personal rights), or breaches a statutory obligation (C.2 Statutory claims the following personal rights: e right to know health information; the right to know research results; the right to C.1 Non-disclosure infringes personal rights. X th benefit; the right to life; and the right to health.
C.1.1 Right to know health information. X asserts that she has a right to know health information. She refers to the Convention of the Council of Europe for the P of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the application of Biology and Medicine. 38 This convention covers all medical and biological applications concerning human beings, including research applications. 39 Pursuant to article 10 everyone is entitled to "know" any information collected about his or her health. According to the Explanatory Report, a person's "right to know" encompasses all information collected about his or her health, whether it be a diagnosis, prognosis or "any other relevant fact". 40 In addition, Article 13 of the Additional Proto Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that, before being ask consent to participate in a research project, "the persons concerned shall be specifically informed, according to the nature and purpose of the research, of arrangements for access to information relevant to the participant arising from the research and to its overall results". The protocol further provides that research participants shall be entitled to know "any information collected on their health" conformity with the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention. If research gives ri to "information of relevance" to the current or future health or quality of life of research participants, this information must be offered to them. That is to be done within a framework of health care or counselling. As to the availability of results, Article 28 of the Additional Protocol provides that the conclusions of the research shall be made available to participants in reasonable tim ri information on risks which are treatable or actionable.
C.1.2 Right to benefit. X refers to a series of international instruments in the area o biomedical research that all call for benefit sharing. For example, the Internation Declaration on Human Genetic Data, 41 which specifically applies to biobanking, requires that the benefits resulting from the research on the data be shared with society as a whole. And Article 3 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 42 provides that, in advancing scientific knowledge, direct and indirect benefits to patients, research participants and other affected individuals should be maximized. In giving effect to the principle of benefit-sharing, benefits may take the form of special assistance to the persons participating in the research, provision of new diagnostics stemming from research, or access to scientific knowled that her participation in the Biobank amounts to a significant contribution. In addition to providing, biennially, blood and urine samples, she frequently fills in questionnaires, answers detailed questions about her education, employment, phys activity, nutrition habits, general health condition etc. She has also allowed the Biobank access to her health records and other records th ical at may be related to her ealth. X maintains that, in exchange, the Biobank owes her a benefit in the form of n the h lhe Biobank to take measures to avoid any risk, not just genetic sks, as the Biobank has or ought to have superior knowledge and access to all e lure by the Biobank to disclose "essential information that would enable her to assess the risks she and her family might run" constitutes a violation of maintains that the Biobank's refusal to feed back pertinent health data violates a ing in h full disclosure of any findings pertinent to her health.
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C.1. 3 Right to life. X also invokes her right to life, laid down in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 44 As well as a negative obligatio not to take anyone's life, this right imposes a positive obligation on the state and public authorities to protect the right to life. 45 Applying the Convention to the nondisclosure policy of UK Biobank, Johnson and Kaye have argued that Article 2 of ECHR could impose a positive obligation on UK Biobank to put in place measures to avoid a risk to the lives of the participants. 46 More specifically, citing the Osman case 47 they argue that this positive obligation entails the provision of feedback of risk of a serious genetic disease, if this is revealed during the course of the researc project. 48 In Osman, the ECHR noted that Article 2 of the Convention might, in wel defined circumstances, imply a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. X takes this a step further and asserts that she can reasonably expect t ri relevant records.
C.1. 4 Right to health.
Next, X invokes her right to health. Failure to protect a person's health may amount to a breach of the right to respect for one's private life, set forth in Article 8 of the ECHR. 49 'Private life' includes not merely a right to control personal information, but also protection of privacy interests in physical and moral integrity. 50 , 51 The right imposes both negative and positive obligations on th state, including a right to have assistance in the fulfilment and enjoyment of one's private life. 52 X argues that Article 8 also applies to the Biobank as a semi-public institution, so that fai her right to health. 
C.2.1 Clinical trials.
X analogizes her situation with that of human subjects in clinical trials, who are protected by the Dutch Act on Medical Scientific Research involv Human Subjects. The Act provides that participants in clinical research enjoy certa information rights during the trial. Specifically, in the event the trial has serious events that turn out to be more adverse than foreseen in the research protocol, the investigator must immediately notify the trial subject. In addition, Article 10 of the ct provides that the investigator is responsible for informing the subject about "the ow all als.
n combine with access to her health records, family history and life-style data. X argues, therefore, that the Biobank setting crosses the line between 
C.2.2 Right to know medical record.
As a patient, X has a statutory right to kn the health information kept by her treating physician in her medical record. That would include information about diagnosis, test results, prognosis, risks and treatment.54 According to X, this right should be extended to health information generated in the context of the Biobank for the following reasons. First, the Biobank has been established by and forms an integral part of a series of academic hospit From X's perspective, the Biobank is an extension of the healthcare infrastructure. Second, X's donations of blood and urine and physical examinations qualify as medical examinations. Third, the Biobank research on her samples and data is not an isolated and incidental affair, performed in a remote university lab. Rather, all measurements and findings have added to an integrated and comprehensive dataset that the Biobank ca research and care.
C.3 Negligence: Breach of generally accepted standard of care
It has been argued that researchers have a duty of ancillary care to subjects of research, based on the principle that, by participating in (clinical) research, participants entrust their health to the researchers. 55 In the context of the duty encompasses the duty to feed back findings to individual participants. In supp of this claim, X cites the International Guidelines for Ethical E Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 56 and international precedent.
C.3.1 CIOMS Guidelines.
The CIOMS Guidelines apply to epidemiological studie They are based on the four basic ethical principles governing all research involving human subjects: respect for persons, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.
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Respect for persons incorporates autonomy, which requires that those who are cap of deliberation about their personal goals should be treated with respect for their capacity for self-determination. Beneficence is the ethical obligation to maximize possible benefits and to minimize possible harms and wrongs. Non-maleficen ("Do no harm") holds a central position in the tradition of medical ethics, and gu against avoidable harm to research subjects. The principle of justice is mainl concerned with the rules of distributive justice: the class of persons bearing the burden should receive an appropriate benefit. The preamble to the CIOMS Guidelines provides that part of the benefit that communities, groups and individuals may reasonably expect from participating in studies is that they will be told o findings that pertain to their health. 59 In informing individuals of the findings and their pertinence to health, their level of literacy and comprehension must be considered. Research protocols should include provision for communicating such information to communities and individuals. 60 In addition, research findings and advice to communities should be publicized by whatever suitable means are available. This may entail that, where feasible, specific testing and individual couns 62 Gene donor participating in Estonian Gene Bank have the right to access personally their data stored in E data.
C.3.2 Disclosure of findings is supported by international precedent. X refers to the
Estonian Genebank, a project similar to the Biobank. The Estonian Genebank is national Gene Bank consisting of tissue samples, descriptions of DNA, descriptions o state of health and genealogies of the Estonian population. The objective of Estonian Genebank is twofold: to enable gene and health research to find genes tha influence the development of illnesses and to provide a gene donor with an opportunity to assess his or her health risks and diagnose illnesses more precisely, prevent illness and receive more effective treatment in the future.
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The Framingham Heart Study. In 1948, at a time that the administrators in the Tuskegee study should have realized that an effective medicine had become availabl for their subjects, the US Public Health Service initiated what is considered the 'mother of all biobanks', the Framingham Heart Study. 64 The study was to look f the root causes of cardiovascular diseases (CVD), which had become an Am epidemic. 65 The project was designed to study the expression of coronary artery disease in a "normal" or unselected population and to determine the factors predisposing to the development of the disease through clinical and laboratory examinations and long-term follow-up of such a group. 66 The researchers recruited 5,209 men and women between the ages of 30 and 62 from the town of Framingham, Massachusetts. With time, they found suggestive links between high blood pressure and heart disease, between tobacco use and heart disease, and between elevated leve of blood cholesterol and heart disease. 67 The researchers wanted everyone to have t information they had on the risk factors for heart disease. Reportedly, at times they wanted to shout from the rooftops: "Quit smoking", or "Lose weight". But all they would say was "See your physician". 68 This policy of non-disclosure rested on two premises. First, the objective of the study was to be a long-term observational stud healthy people, not to be a public health program. Before the physicians could do anything about heart disease, they had to wait for others to transform the Study's findings into treatments and preventive measures. 69 Second, the local doctors of Framingham were worried that the Heart Study was the first step toward federal intrusion into their practice -they wanted to be sure that they would not lose their patients to the Study's doctors. To maintain the trust of local physicians, the Study's researchers would not treat or even offer advice to the participants they were seeing. The only way to let the volunteers' physicians, and all physicians, know what advice to give was to publish the results of their years of observation. These publications had a powerful effect and laid the groundwork for translating medical research from the observations to real changes in the way doctors practice medicine. l, smoking, obesity, diabetes, and physical inactivity. The accomplishments have been listed ents of the twentieth century. 
The Biobank's brief
The Biobank advances a number of legal defences. It claims that its contractual no disclosure policy is clear (A. Clear contract) and its underlying rationale still valid (B.
Rational policy). Next, it argues that that the personal rights invoked by X do not apply (C. No negligence). Finally, the Biobank counters that an obligati non to (offer to) disclose its findings would be at odds with a series of law and policy considerations ical and practical justifications for non-disclosure).
ces in the ulation screening administrators and radiologists were sued for not reporting findings or reporting findings as 'not suspect', which later gn and fatal.
of clinical e t do not (D. Statutory, med A. Clear contract
The Biobank maintains that the PIB contains a clear explanation of the Biobank's disclosure policy. By signing the consent form X has agreed to this policy, the terms of which are crystal clear and not in need of further interpretation. The referen the PIB to personalised medicine are generic descriptions of the ultimate goal of bank. They cannot reasonably be construed so as to confer on participants an enforceable right to receive personalised feedback on Biobank findings. Similar limitations on the disclosure of findings have been upheld by the courts in the context of population screening, when pop turned out to be mali
B. Rational Policy
The rationale for the non-disclosure policy is still valid. Statutory standards care would require any feedback to be analytically valid, clinically valid and hav clinical utility. 73 74 The assessment of analytical validity would require the performance of independent confirmatory testing. Clinical validity refers to the quality and quantity of empirical evidence regarding the association between a genotype and a particular clinical outcome. 75 The interpretation of associations reported by research on the Biobank requires a chain of evidence substantiating the validity of the association found in a single initial study. 76 77 78 Results tha meet this basic prerequisite simply do not constitute "information" and the Biobank cannot reasonably be held to an obligation to provide "non-information".
. 
C.1.1 International declarations are not binding. The international declarations
invoked by X are either non-binding or non-enforceable, as they have not been ra implementation at the national level, the instruments cannot be used to construe enforceable obligations on the part of the Biobank in a private cause of action.
C.1.2 International declarations do not apply to observational research.
Most international instruments invoked by X do not apply to the Biobank anyway, as th apply to interventional or clinical research rather than the observational research pursued by the Biobank. Admittedly, the Council of Europe Recomm on research on biological materials of human origin does apply to research using biological materials kept in population biobanks. However, it does not contain a provision on disclosure of the results from this type of research. The Recommendation even puts severe limitations on the type of screening to be done in such biobanks. It stipulate th scientific research, as it would put too much strain on the free participation an privacy of individuals.
79

C.1.3 International guidelines limit reporting obligations.
The international instruments and declarations invoked by X do not provide for an unconditional obligation on the part of scientists to feed back findings to individual participants. Article 10 of the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data explicitly provides that it does not apply to research on data for which links to identifiable persons are irretrievably broken or to data that do not lead to individual findings concerning persons who have participated in such a research. The CIOMS Guidelines allow that an ethics committee may approve the non-disclosure of the data for a stated reason that will, itself, be given to the participant. Such reasons could include: lack of relevance of data, limitations of predictive capability of research data, concerns of misinterpretation by the participant, absence of 'good clinical practices' standards exploratory research or lack of feasibility (e.g., data are anonymised). Also, the duty to inform research subjects of any finding that relates to their particular 'health status' at the end of the study is open to wide interpretation -it is not clear that it would include most polygenic determinants of disease susceptibility, even if they had been validated. 80 The CIOMS Guidelines p 
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should be advised that it may not be possible to inform them about findings that e of a sk iobank involved in a series of (alleged) criminal confrontations over a couple of years, the ithout extensive translation, decoding and terpretation of a given finding, whether a specific individual is at a particular risk. rm subjects of trial ata. Indeed, Renegar et al have concluded that there appears to be no definitive ce t to know his medical records and any corresponding obligations for healthcare providers, such as the duty to disclose to ed in the course of diagnosis, prognosis and erapy, do not apply to the Biobank setting.
pertain to their health, but that they should not take this to mean that they are fre the disease or condition under study.
C.1.4 No violation of the right to life and health. The European Convention on
Human Rights is directed at states. It does not impose positive or negative obligations on "non-state" entities such as the Biobank. In the Osman case cited by X, the European Court of Human Rights made it clear that any positive obligations for the State (to safeguard lives or to protect private and family life) must be interpreted in manner that does not pose an impossible or disproportionate burden, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. For the Court not every claimed risk to life could entail for the national authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that ri from materializing. 81 Osman, furthermore, is clearly distinguishable from the B scenario at hand. Unlike Osman, which involved specific, acquainted individuals 84 Much effort has been spent in making a clear delineation between the role of the researcher and the role of the treating physician, because of the conflict of interest that the dual roles present. 85 Imposing an obligat on the Biobank to (offer to) feed back findings to individuals would reinforce the 'therapeutic misconception' held by participants and sometimes also by researchers. Some have even proposed a ban for treating physicians to do research on their patients. 86 From the researcher perspective too, blurring the lines between clinical research and research obligations should be undertaken only for compelling reasons, based on accurate information and clear informed consent.
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C.3.1.2 Ancillary care and bailment analogy does not apply.
The Biobank further argues that no duty of ancillary care can be based on the theory of 'entrustment'. Su a duty is grounded in the vulnerability and dependency of participants. 88 Howev participation in the Biobank does not render the participants 'vulnerable'. Most of them are not patients, but healthy volunteers. And if they become patients during the course of their participation, they will be treated outside the Biobank setting, in an ordinary clinical care setting. Likewise, the participants in the Biobank are not dependent on the Biobank. They can withdraw from the Biobank at any time. The Biobank does not offer them anything they need to maintain their health, to cure their disease or to take informed reproductive decisions. To fulfill these needs, they are dependent on their GP or specialist healthcare professional, not on the Biobank. Likewise, the legal theory described in the law concerning bailment does not hold in the context of the Biobank. The Biobank is not a bailee. It is not offering a service o any kind. It is not a depository where people can store their samples and data and have them returned or fixed. The Biobank has not undertaken to heal, cure or care fo any participant. It is a research facility where people can donate samples and data fo future research. Another vital element belying the classification of the relationship b participants are not being charged. If the Biobank were to be seen as a professional bailee of some sort, with ancillary duties on top of its obligations as a bailee, then, under Dutch law, it would have a statutory right to compensation for its service 89 C.3.1.3 Case law on standard of care. It follows from a number of Dutch court case that clinicians performing population screening are not held to a standard of clinical care, but to a standard akin to that applied to reasonably acting and reasonably competent "screening" radiologists in "similar circumstances". 90 Whether the standard has been breached has to be determined by an expert witness, taking i account the population screening in its original context. Applying this standard to the Biobank situation, it is clear that the Biobank will not be held to the standard o individual medical professional acting in a clinical s rformed upon sts may be developed as a result of the m Heart Study. 95 hich fully respected the due process and other "guarantees which legitimately placed deed d EC nd standard is even lower than the standard for population screening, as the Biobank is not intended to find high or low classes of at-risk individuals, but to carry out research, and as the researchers are not clinicians.
C.3.2 Foreign examples.
The Biobank's policy of non-disclosure is further supported by a number of similar policies of similar biobanks in other countries. In the Singapore Tissue Network, neither donor nor doctor will receive the results of research carried out using donated samples. 91 The UK Biobank will not provide individual feedback to participants of results obtained through the research proces any reason. 92 Participants in the Canadian biobank CartaGene will not re individual research results, unless they have opted to receive a document containing the measurements taken during the enrolment visit.
93 Generation Scotland will give participants health information on some important clinical measurements such as blood pressure, cholesterol and kidney function, but no personal g 94 that participants will not be informed of the results of the research pe their genetic blood sample, although genetic te combined analysis of samples in the Framingha
D. Statutory, medical and practical justifications for non disclosure D.1 Statutory justifications for non-disclosure D.1.1 Compliance with domestic law.
Any offer to disclose any findings must be compliant with domestic law. This truism was reiterated by the European Court of Human Rights in Osman, where the Court considered as a relevant factor the need to ensure that the police exercised their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner w restraints on the scope of their action" to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice. Applied to biobanks, any obligation to feed back results and findings, in any obligation to warn, is always subject to statutory, legitimately placed restraints.
D.1.2. Protection of the public against false alarm/assurances.
According to the Biobank, meeting X's request for health information in compliance with these statutory restraints is not feasible. The provision of medical or health information by public-and private-sector parties to populations, subpopulations and individuals, both healthy and affected, is governed by a host of sometimes conflicting statutes an directives. The thrust of these consumer and patient protection regulations is to protect the general public against "false alarms", "non-actionable alarms" and "false reassurances". To that end, these regulations prohibit or condition the generation a provision of health information. The thrust of these conditions is that both the information and the way it is offered and presented must meet certain standards. These standards range from technical requirements for the devices used in generating the information 96 to a prior demonstration of a positive outcome of a cost-benefit 
D.2 Medical and practical justifications for non disclosure
P majeure', i.e. circumstances which justify an otherwise actionable act or failure to act. The Biobank advances the following justifications: complexity, costs and consent to know.
D.2.1 Complexity and (in)competence.
The broad array of new genome-scale tests ha led to the discovery of multiple abnormal or 'unexpected findings', analogous to th 'incidentalomas' that are often discovered in radiological studies. 99 The application of comprehensive genotype and functional genomic measurements across the genera population is likely to yield incidental findings for nearly everyone. Any large-scale genomic panel is therefore likely routinely to report false-positive results. Even if genomic tests were to achieve 100% sensitivity and a false-positive rate of 0, th of the incidentalome remain and will lead to iatrophic pathology, i.e. aggressive diagnostic and therapeutic investigations in an otherwise healthy individual. 100 The consequences of an incidentalome for Biobank researchers are obvious. To oblige them to look beyond the variables under study to findings of potential clinical significance for individual participants would place on them a disproportionate burden. Lacking clin 101 102 B genomic measures. As even regular healthcare providers lack training and ex the interpretation of genetic research results, 103 X might be subjected to unnecessary follow-up tests.
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D.2.2 Costs.
Even the most ardent proponent of a reporting obligation has acknowledged that the disclosure of results has economic implications for research in planning their budgets and for funding agencies in determining an appropriate level an duration of funding. 105 Or, as another 'full disclosure' proponent put it: "The problem, of course, is money". 106 The consequence of requiring researchers to bu for managing incidental findings is "in the present financial climate ...that half a much research gets done, and that has, in my mind, a much greater impact on societ than the very, very low incidence of incidental findings which are actually correct and an even lower incidence where there is something you could have done". 107 The setting in which Biobank results are generated typically lacks the resources fo additional research, replication of results and clinical counselling and follow-up of individual participants. Costs will be increased by the requirement that the disclo of genetic and predictive health information must be "subject to appropriate gene counselling".
sure tic h h him or her, is a etermining element in that respect. A mere telephone conversation with a medical urden he . r as f blished findings (disclosure proponents claim it could also cover unpublished findings), 111 , then the Biobank would have to go back to 150,000 mes per year to ask them whether or not they want to ank in tute of also ves a heterogeneous t of stakeholders, including not only the Biobank itself, but also third-party 108 Notably, Article 7.1 of the recent Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that 'a genetic test for healt purposes may only be performed under individualized medical supervision'. 109 According to the explanatory report, 'a precise evaluation of the situation of the person concerned, involving direct contact with a medical doctor wit d doctor, for example, does not allow for such evaluation'. This requirement of 'live' and individualized medical supervision is likely to impose a disproportionate b on the Biobank, in view of the volume of findings and participants.
D.2.3 Consent to know.
All international legal instruments relied upon by X provide that the participants' right not to know should always be respected. However, participants' desire to know or not to know cannot be fixed at the outset, but will vary according to their age, sex, offspring, education level, employment status, ethnicity, religion, health status and other factors. Their wishes will also vary according to t disease concerned, probability of onset, and the (im)possibility of an intervention Their wishes may also change over time, as participants grow sadder and wiser o therapeutic or life-style modifications become possible. The wealth of findings and the infinite variety of participants' desires to know or not to know these findings would make it practically unfeasible for the Biobank to meet the requirement o obtaining participants' prior informed consent to know. The Framingham Heart Study, for example, has produced more than 1000 scientific papers since its inception or some 20 papers per annum. 110 If the Biobank reporting obligation were to be limited to pu individuals (or their GPs) 20 ti be informed on the individual implications (positive or negative) of the finding concerned.
Considerations of the court
The outcome of the case is hard to predict. The above discussion has been limited to the threshold legal issue of whether participants have the right to receive (full) disclosure of pertinent health information. In practice, any liability of the Biob this respect will depend on the circumstances of the case, procedural issues, sta limitations, burden of proof, damages (loss of chance), and causation. Much will depend on the actual configuration of the Biobank, which invol se researchers (academic and from industry). The Biobank is not necessarily in a position to secure relevant disclosures from these third parties. Subject to these limitations, a Dutch civil law court might consider as follows. 
